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What is the nature of ‘youth politics’, if 
any? This article proposes an analytical 
lens which may help us consider ‘youth’ 
as a useful category, and ‘youth politics’ 
in terms of the conflicts and negotiations 
over claiming or defending youthfulness. 
Understood in this fashion, youth politics 
is mediated by the position of the young 
in class, gender, racial, sexual and other 
involved social structures. It concludes 
that the political outlook of a young per-
son may be shaped not just by the exclu-
sive preoccupation with ‘youthfulness’, 
but also by his/her position in society as 
citizen, poor, female, or a member of a 
sexual minority.
Keywords: Youth, Arab Spring, politics, 
Middle East, youthfulness, youth activism
Introduction
Is there such a thing as ‘youth politics’ in 
the way we have gender politics, working 
class politics, or poor people’s politics; 
and if there is, what are its attributes and 
modes of expression? After all, what is the 
significance of youth politics, if any? Even 
though some have expressed doubts 
about ‘youth’ as a meaningful category or 
considered it as a mere construct, here I 
would like to propose an analytical lens 
which may help understanding youth as a 
useful category with distinct politics. In this 
sense ‘youth politics’ will be viewed in 
terms of the conflicts and negotiations 
over claiming or defending youthfulness; 
but this is a politics that is mediated by the 
position of the young in class, gender, 
racial, sexual and other involved social 
structures. In brief, the political outlook of 
a young person may be shaped not just by 
the exclusive preoccupation with ‘youth-
fulness’, but also by his/her positionality 
as citizen, poor, female, or a member of 
a sexual minority. The propositions 
advanced here are informed by my obser-
vations on young people’s lives in the con-
temporary Middle East, where the spec-
tacular Arab uprisings brought youth to 
the forefront of politics. 
A review of popular discourse as well as 
scholarly works on the Arab revolutions 
leaves little doubt about the leading pres-
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ence of the young people in these 
momentous political episodes. Perhaps 
no other social group has gained as much 
credence in these transformative events as 
youth, and in no other times in its history 
has Middle East politics witnessed so 
much attention to youth—whether as vic-
tims of economic marginalization or 
agents of transformation. A range of writ-
ings narrates the prominent role of the 
young and students in the region’s national 
movements and revolutions. They discuss 
how, for instance, the indignant youth suf-
fered from the highest rate of unemploy-
ment in the world, how they moved from 
being passive subjects into active agents, 
in what way the rising ‘youth movements’ 
initiated the revolutions, or how the Coptic 
youth turned into a political player in post-
revolution Egypt (Erlich; Sayer and Yousef; 
Desai et al; Abdalla; Shehata; Delgado). 
Indeed, the notion of ‘youth revolutions’ 
referring to the Arab Spring readily 
pointed to an assumed propensity of 
youth for radical politics.
While we have certainly learnt more about 
the involvement of young people in poli-
tics, much of the literature displays the 
perennial problem of treating youth sim-
ply as incidental or at best tangential to 
the core stories and analyses. As such, this 
genre of writing discusses not the youth 
per se, but rather such subjects of conten-
tious politics, the uprising, or activism in 
certain times or places in which youth hap-
pen to play a key role, such that if we were 
to substitute youth with a different group, 
it would have no significant bearings on 
the analyses and narratives. At the same 
time, in the studies where ‘youth’ do take 
a more prominent place, there are little or 
no discussions about the specificities of 
youth claims and presence in such events; 
youth often appears as a term to desig-
nate an age cohort rather than a concep-
tual category with particular analytical 
meanings. In fact, many of the writings on 
‘youth movements’ are of this nature; they 
are not about ‘youth movements’ per se, 
but about certain political organizations, 
parties, or networks—such as the Kefaya, 
the Egyptian democracy movement of the 
mid-2000s—in which young people hap-
pen to be active. This kind of treatment is 
not limited to the Middle East, but seems 
to inform much of the literature on youth 
and politics in general.  This strand of 
scholarship on youth then tends to exam-
ine not youth politics per se, but youth in 
politics. The discussions of  ‘youth in poli-
tics’ do certainly teach us a great deal 
about the extent to which young people 
care about or get engaged in public life. 
But they say little about the particularities—
concerns, forms, direction, pitfalls or 
promises—of such political engagement. 




There is globally a sizeable scholarship 
that takes ‘youth politics’ as its central 
focus. Here youth politics is construed 
from the sociological reality of the young 
in terms of their transitional position from 
childhood and dependence to adulthood 
and responsibility. While some in this 
genre tend to view the young as emo-
tional, inexperienced, and potential insti-
gators of ‘youth war’, most see them as 
creative producers of subcultures and 
new lifestyles, as well as carriers of revolu-
tionary posture and politics.1 In fact, here 
youth appear as key players in the major 
political movements in history all the way 
from Ancient Greece to the English 
Revolution, Protestant Reformation, the 
early 19th Century, and down to the 
momentous episode of the 1960s. In the 
inter-war period, youth as a distinct social 
group assumed such an import as to make 
both the right and leftist political blocks 
invest heavily in the transformative poten-
tial of the youth. This gave rise to myriad 
‘youth movements’ with intimate links to 
communist or fascist ideologies and 
personas, including Mussolini, who con-
sidered youth as the “avant-garde of 
the fascist revolution” (Kalman 343–366; 
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Passerini). Indeed, the old idea of associat-
ing youth with nature, body building, and 
soul searching was reincarnated after the 
Second World War in the ministries of 
Youth and Sports in most postcolonial 
nations, where a variety of ‘young move-
ments’ such as the Young Officers in Egypt 
or Young Turks in the Turkish Republic 
ascended to the political stage (Sukarieh 
and Tannock 81-82).
The historic events of the 1960s brought 
youth more than ever onto the forefront of 
revolutionary politics. The student revolts 
in Berkeley and its Free Speech Movement 
spreading through the US campuses, 
together with youth and student rebel-
lions in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and 
Asia, and especially the May 1968 general 
strike in factories and colleges presented 
the youth as if they possessed an inherent 
radical habitus. Such notions as ‘youthful 
rebelliousness’ and ‘youth war’ virtually 
linked those revolutionary moments to a 
youthful disposition, assumed to be 
shaped by a specific ‘stage of life’, a mix of 
alienation and presence, or the genera-
tion war (Matza 110; Keniston 7). While 
some argued that age conflict had taken 
the place of class conflict, others took the 
young as the new revolutionary class that 
had replaced the proletariat as the agent 
of political transformation (Turner 398; 
Rowntree and Rowntree). The idea of 
‘youth as class’ and university as a new 
bastion of revolutionary politics resonated 
strongly with some major social theorists 
ranging from Jerome Ferrand, Fred 
Halliday, C. Wright Mills, and Herbert 
Marcuse. For the sociologist Alain 
Touraine, the university came to occupy 
the same position as the great capitalist 
enterprise (Touraine). The idea of ‘revolu-
tionary youth’ also permeated into the dis-
course of the Arab uprisings, which young 
people had initiated. Some observers 
went so far as to describe key historical 
moments in the Middle East far prior to 
the Arab uprisings in terms of the revolu-
tionary role of youth. As “an age group 
and as an educated public”, youth and stu-
dents are suggested to have burst into the 
political scene to shape nationalist move-
ments, liberation struggles, and revolu-
tions, as well as Islamism and liberalism 
(Erlich x).
A longitudinal look at the young people’s 
behavior, however, would make the 
claims of ‘radical youth’ untenable. Young 
people, whether in the West or in the 
Middle East, have also exhibited both 
passive and conservative orientations. It is 
well known that the political youth of the 
1960s and 1970s in the US and Britain 
turned by the 1980s into Yuppies or the 
self-absorbed and conservative young 
professionals—orientations very different 
from the working class punk subculture. 
For their part, Arab youth went through a 
process of hibernation for decades before 
joining the 2011 uprisings; young people 
in Tunisia were constricted by the police 
state under the Ben Ali, and those in 
Egypt showed little interest during the 
1990s in any sort of civic activism let alone 
revolutionary politics, if they had not 
joined the Islamist Jihadi fringes. Large-
scale surveys of Arab youth conducted 
after the 2011 revolutions point to an esca-
lating apathy and aversion to politics fol-
lowing an earlier political fervor that 
marked the uprisings. In fact, some 
observers have concluded that Arab 
youth usually display apathy when it 
comes to the conventional politics, politi-
cal parties, or elections, simply because of 
their deep disenchantment with formal 
intuitions. Yet the very same passive youth 
may turn political in particular political cir-
cumstances, such as during the Arab 
uprisings (Desai et al 165). 
From Passive to Active
Why and how do the young turn from pas-
sive individuals into active and even revo-
lutionary agents? More specifically, how 
do we explain the widespread political 
turn among the Arab youth in the 2011 
events? One suggestion is that youth apa-
thy changes when their discontent rises so 
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high that they resort to radical and dra-
matic action with perceived impact on 
government and cost to themselves (Desai 
et al 165). Here the sources of discontent 
are invariably attributed to a series of mis-
fortunes, chiefly exclusion and unemploy-
ment. Thus, in the common narrative, the 
Arab world’s highest youth unemploy-
ment—25% compared to world average 
14.4% in pre-revolution—meant late mar-
riage (until 30s) and ‘waithood’, leading to 
frustration and ultimately revolt.2
There is certainly a great plausibility in 
these narratives, in particular when it 
comes to uncertainty and ‘waithood’, 
which indeed appear to be mostly youth 
problems. But broadly speaking, unem-
ployment and economic and social exclu-
sion are hardly the exclusive predicament 
of the young; adults have also suffered 
from these misfortunes. But if the focus is 
on youth, what type of youth we are 
speaking about—college students, gradu-
ates, rich, poor, those living with parents, 
or married young couples who must rely 
on themselves? The youth of the rich and 
privileged families are not supposed to 
feel social and economic exclusion, and 
should not, by definition, be outraged 
and rebellious. Studies on the economics 
of Middle Eastern youth show that family 
income has the greatest bearing on 
young people’s educational opportuni-
ties, achievements, and eventually 
income; the more well-off the family is, 
the better chance for better degrees and 
opportunities.3 Even those non-privi-
leged high school or college students 
(in a 2016 MENA youth survey by the 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 37% of youth 
between 16-30 years of age were stu-
dents) who do live with and depend on 
parents may not experience the hardship 
of unemployment or economic exclusion 
as long as they remain outside of job 
market; it is their parents who in their role 
as providers for these youngsters should 
feel the crunch of socio-economic exclu-
sion. Unlike in, say, the US or Britain, 
where the autonomous youth depend 
mostly on themselves to subsist, in Arab 
societies it is the families that usually bear 
the burden of youths, sometimes even 
after their children get married.4 In other 
words, the economic pressure falls more 
on parents than on their children, and 
thus it is these parents who should be 
rebelling. This might explain why a large 
number of the young respondents (71%) 
in the MENA youth survey described 
their economic situation as “very good” 
despite the relative economic downturn, 
because these young people were living 
on their parents’ income. However, mar-
ried couples who were responsible for 
their own household did complain about 
the pressure of bad economic conditions.
A year before the Egyptian Revolution, the 
veteran columnist Hasan Nafaa published 
a piece in Al-Masry Al-Youm where he 
suggested that new social actors were 
emerging onto Egypt’s political scene 
(Nafaa). He described three occasions 
where young people (with work and fami-
lies) approached him to start a campaign 
to change the political status quo in 
Egypt—to support the opposition leader 
Mohamed Baradei, endorse groups 
demanding to amend the constitution, 
and help them push the parliament to 
reform things. Nafaa then suggested that 
we are facing a new category of youth in 
their 30s and 40s who hold responsibili-
ties for their nuclear families as parents 
and for their jobs in public and private sec-
tors; these youth are inclined not for revo-
lution to alter everything, but towards 
cooperation and peaceful, managed 
change. These young activists, he argued, 
were different from the radical students of 
the 1970s or those in the April 6th Youth 
Movement in Egypt. These youth were not 
simply interested in their own individual or 
family matters, but were also concerned 
about the public good. Deeply worried 
about the failure of the state, they wanted 
to do something about it; they sensed that 
the alarming situation could lead to an 
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explosion, especially when neither the 
regime nor the traditional opposition were 
able to bring about reforms. “I do not think 
I exaggerate in stating”, Nafaa concluded, 
“that the advent of this new age cohort 
(generation) in the political stage consti-
tutes a turning point in mobilization for 
change.”
Who are Youth? 
This interesting observation raises serious 
conceptual questions about and compli-
cates the meaning of youth and youth 
political agency. Can one consider this 
30-40 year-old age cohort with marriage, 
work and responsibility ‘youth’? Is ‘youth’ 
simply an age-category? Is it simply a con-
struction imagined and presented by oth-
ers? Or is there no such  thing as ‘youth’ at 
all? The policy circles such as the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
usually define youth in terms of certain 
age groups—some take it as those 15-25 
year of age, others 15-30, while others up 
to 40 (UNDP 22). Even though operation-
alization is necessary for policy purposes, 
such designations with varied ranges 
remain inevitably arbitrary. It is therefore 
not a surprise that some scholars reject 
the category of ‘youth’ in terms of ‘life 
stage’ or in terms of generation altogether, 
considering it instead as a ‘construction’—a 
social identity that is imagined by others 
about the young (Sukarieh and Tannock). 
But this is no less problematic. It is true that 
elders, the state, or moral authorities do 
intervene to construct different images of 
youth as, for instance, ‘rebellious’, ‘brave’, 
the ‘future’, or ‘dangerous’. This however 
does not mean that youth lack any reality 
of their own. Perhaps we should be asking 
how the young define themselves; for this 
can help us to identify those particular 
traits that, beyond external attributions, 
shape young people’s image of them-
selves and their behavior. Denying the 
young the ability to define their own real-
ity, or overlooking their paradoxical posi-
tionality in the social structure, can lead to 
such inaccurate conclusions that, as 
Bourdieu put is, youth is “nothing but a 
word”.
I have suggested that “youth” in the sense 
of young persons is in part related to a 
particular life stage and thus a particular 
location in the social structure, where the 
individuals navigate between the world of 
childhood (as the time of vulnerability, 
innocence and need of protection) and 
adulthood, the world of work and respon-
sibility. Theoretically, a young person 
experiences a life of relative autonomy, a 
kind of ‘structural irresponsibility’, where 
the individual neither substantially 
depends on other people such as parents, 
nor is responsible for others, such as his/
her own family or children. This seems to 
be in line with the perceptions of young 
Egyptians who, in my interviews with them, 
broadly described themselves as being 
less experienced and less responsible.5 In 
modern times, mass schooling has played 
a crucial role in the production of youth 
and prolongation of the time in which the 
individual lives and operates as young. 
‘Youth’ in the sense of ‘behaving young’ 
represents a sort of Bourdieuian habitus—
a series of mental and cognitive disposi-
tions, ways of being, feeling, and carrying 
oneself that are associated with the socio-
logical position of structural irresponsibil-
ity. This is how young people experience 
‘youthfulness’. 
Of course the reality of young people’s 
lives is more complex and may vary across 
cultural, class, and gender divides. For 
instance, many adolescents in poor fami-
lies may have to seek work to earn a living 
instead of attending school; girls may get 
married early thus assuming the respon-
sibility of being a parent and spouse 
before experiencing youthfulness; unmar-
ried girls, even in the middle class fami-
lies, often take some responsibilities to 
help their mothers in cooking, cleaning, 
or caring for the children. There is also the 
possibility of the young couples who, 
once married, may appear as if they have 
moved out of the youth world into adult-
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hood (in 2016, 29% of youth were inter-
viewed for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung’s 
MENA youth survey either married or 
divorced, and 15% of ‘youth’ in Egypt 
described themselves as ‘adults’). 
Interestingly, anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that the youngsters who did not 
experience youthfulness in their young 
age may tend to ‘experience’ it years after 
they move to adult life. A 40-year-old 
woman from Lebanon stated recently that 
she did not want to get married and be 
responsible at this age, because she “had 
lost her youthfulness during the civil war”, 
and “now want[ed] to experience it”. In 
fact, there seems to be a trend of 30+ 
working or non-working women who do 
not wish to get married but desire to live 
independently, while we also may 
encounter young males who hold jobs 
and earn a living but remain unmarried 
and live with parents.
How can we account for these sub-groups 
of the young? Are they not youth? If they 
are, what make them so? Simply age? If so, 
what then accounts for their positionality 
in the social structure? The relevance of 
these questions boils down to the reason 
we strive to conceptualize ‘youth’ in the 
first place. If the purpose is to identify 
youth groups with particular needs and 
abilities in order to devise policies to 
address them, then the particularities of 
such subgroups should be acknowledged 
and highlighted. However, if the purpose 
is, as in this essay, to understand what kind 
of politics youth espouse, then we should 
focus on their positionality in the social 
structure to determine if the individuals 
assume some sort of youth habitus or live 
and behave like adults even in their young 
age. 
Youth Politics
If we conceive of ‘youth’ in this fashion, 
youth politics then takes a different form 
from what is commonly perceived and 
presented. In this sense, youth politics is 
not the same as ‘student politics’, which is 
concerned with student rights, tuition cost, 
and educational policies, as well as con-
tentions that are shaped by the school 
environment. Curricula can potentially cul-
tivate critical awareness about, say, racism 
or colonialism, or a university’s objection-
able investments in certain countries can 
potentially cause campaigns of divest-
ment, all of which are facilitated by the fact 
that college campuses brings students 
together helping collective action. The 
protests in Spain’s universities in 2010 or 
those led by Camila Vellejo in Chile in 
2011, concerning public spending on edu-
cation and an end to the commercializa-
tion of schooling, exemplify what I mean 
by a ‘student movement’. On the other 
hand, youth politics is also distinct from 
such things as the ‘youth chapters’ of dif-
ferent political movements or organiza-
tions, be they Fascist, Ba’athist, or leftist. 
Rather, youth politics, strictly speaking, is 
essentially about claiming or reclaiming 
youthfulness; it expresses the collective 
challenge whose central goal consists of 
defending and extending the youth habi-
tus—a set of dispositions, ways of being, 
feeling, and carrying oneself (e.g., a 
greater demand for autonomy, individual-
ity, mobility, and security of transition to 
the adult world) that are shaped by the 
sociological fact of being young. 
Countering or curtailing this habitus is 
likely to generate youth dissent.6
Conceptual precision notwithstanding, 
real life is of course more complex. The 
fact is that most youth are students, most 
students are young, and almost all are at 
the same time citizens carrying broader 
concerns. In other words, young people’s 
politics encapsulate contentions that 
derive from their multiple positionalities 
as youth, students, and citizens, filtering 
through class, gender, racial, and other 
identities. So even though young people 
often pursue their exclusively youthful 
claims through cultural politics (e.g. in the 
way that the Iranian youth followed par-
ticular a lifestyle in the 1990s), they may 
blend their youthful claims with other con-
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cerns in their positions as students and 
citizens to mobilize against corruption, 
political repression, or urban exclusion, as 
we saw during the Arab uprisings and 
after. Yet in their involvement in the 
broader political campaigns, the young 
often bring to them a good degree of 
youthful tastes and sensibilities often dis-
played in political graffiti, sociality, fun, 
and youthful energy. 
The mere presence of young people sub-
ject to moral and political discipline does 
not necessarily render them carriers of a 
youth movement, because young per-
sons (as age category) are unable to forge 
a collective challenge to the moral and 
political authority without first turning into 
youth as a social category, that is, turning 
into social actors. Youth as a social cate-
gory, as collective agents, are an essen-
tially modern, mostly urban, phenome-
non. It is in modern cities that “young 
persons” turn into “youth,” by experienc-
ing and developing a particular con-
sciousness about themselves as being 
young. Schooling, prevalent in urban 
areas, serves as a key factor in producing 
and prolonging the period of youth, while 
it cultivates status, expectations, and, pos-
sibly, critical awareness. Cities, as loci of 
diversity, creativity, and anonymity, pres-
ent opportunities for young people to 
explore alternative role models and 
choices, and they offer venues to express 
individuality as well as collective identity. 
Mass media, urban spaces, public parks, 
shopping malls, cultural complexes, and 
local street corners provide arenas for the 
formation and expression of collective 
identities. Individuals may bond and con-
struct identities through such deliberate 
associations and networks as schools, 
street corners circles, peer groups, and 
youth magazines. However, identities are 
formed mostly through ‘passive net-
works’—that is, instantaneous communica-
tions among atomized individuals that are 
established by the tacit recognition of 
their commonalities and that are medi-
ated directly through the gaze in public 
space, or indirectly through mass media.7 
As present agents in the public space, the 
young recognize common traits by notic-
ing (seeing) shared symbols, for instance, 
inscribed in styles (T-shirts, blue jeans, 
hairstyle), types of activities (attending 
particular sports, music stores, and stroll-
ing in streets), and places (stadiums, hik-
ing trails, street corners). 
Whether the young behave in their sheer 
youthful impulses or respond to the 
broader and shifting power structures—of 
class, gender, race, or age—has been 
widely debated, but youth political behav-
ior cannot conceivably be understood 
without considering the interplay of youth-
ful agency and societal structures, medi-
ated by political culture and political 
opportunity. Youthful claims are articu-
lated mostly at the cultural level and in the 
form of claims over lifestyle. But youth 
often get involved in both cultural politics 
as well as wider political contentions. Thus, 
to serve as transformative agents, the 
young would often have to go beyond 
their exclusive youthful claims to draw on 
the broader concerns of citizenry. Such 
was the conduct of the Arab youth who 
played the leading role in the 2011 upris-
ings, opening a new chapter in the history 
of the Middle East. 
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Notes
1 Like the US Institute of 
Peace, “Youth Revolt” (Amara)
2 See for instance Shahata 
Dina. “Youth Movements and 
the 25th Jan Revolution”, 
Arab Spring in Egypt: 
Revolution and Beyond. 
edited by Bahgat Korany and 
Rabab El-Mahdi, American 
University of Cairo Press, 
2014; similarly Edward Sayer 
and Tarik Yousef ascribe the 
emergence of the uprisings 
generally to ‘youth exclusion’, 
see Sayer, Edward and 
Tarik Yousef, eds., Young 
Generation Awakening: 
Economics, Society, and 
Policy on the Eve of the Arab 
Spring, Oxford UP, 2016, pp. 
1-2.
3 See Salehi-Esfahani, Djavad, 
“Schooling and Leaning in 
the MENA: The Roles of the 
Family and the State”, Young 
Generation Awakening: 
Economics, Society, and 
Policy on the Eve of the Arab 
Spring, edited by Edward 
Sayer and Tarek Yousef, pp. 
44-45.
4 In 2016, 69% of youth, 16-30 
year old, in the Arab world 
(Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, 
Tunisia, Yemen, including 
the Syrian refugees) were 
living with their parents in 
one household; see Arab 
Youth Survey 2016 conducted 
by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 
Berlin. Aspects of this pattern 
have emerged recently in the 
countries hit by financial crisis 
such as Spain and Greece, 
where youth unemployment 
has resulted in diminishing 
parents’ pension funds.
5 Bayat, Asef, Interviews I, 
Cairo, July 2003.
6 More details may found 
in Bayat, Asef. “Muslim 
Youth and the Claims of 
Youthfulness”, Being Young 
and Muslim: Cultural Politics 
in the Global South and 
North, edited by in Linda 
Herrera and Asef Bayat, 
Oxford University Press, 2013. 
7 For an elaborate exposition 
of “passive networks,” see 
Bayat Asef. Street Politics: 
Poor Peoples Movements in 
Iran. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997, 
chapter 1. 
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